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Delay The Foreclosure Process or Not to Delay? Continuation part 1

Foreclosure docket rocket orders: You can obtain the transcripts at there you will find the official transcript. After reading the transcript read the statute. You will see that the legislature did not intend for any court to side step the law as intended. You will find that in 1985 a similar situation was in traction. The bill failed to pass but not without enough discussion to reveal that the procedure was to be followed to the letter regardless of the needs of the debt collector, the attorney or even the process server. Today it’s the rocket docket courts that use the excuse that they need to somehow over come the clogging of the dockets. So a special General Administrative order (only for Foreclosure cases) was made in order to help the process along. What Lacks reason is, if the courts are so bogged down by so many cases up at the same time, why then create an order that speeds up the foreclosure process of service? This would only add to the bottleneck. If the Sheriff is so slow in serving would that not aid in slowing down the docket clog? Go to http://www.byebyebanksters to get a copy of the General Administrative order and the note to the foreclosureattorneys. This order cannot be obtained by the Cook County court website as a matter of fact as of the time of this writing it is not even listed in the list of GOA orders for 2007 which jumps from 2007-2 to 2007-4. Why is it not there? You be the judge.

More to come.
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Signed, sealed & delivered mortgage fraud Bill

Two bills designed to address some of the problems arising from the economic crisis have been signed by the Obama President. The first deals with mortgage fraud and the other with aid to families who are involved in a situation of exclusion guard their homes.

Look for artists of the scam, the order of the new law on mortgage fraud means seriously. Half billion federal dollars has been allowed to spend on targeting mortgage fraud charges. Agencies such as the secret service, the Postal Service United States and HUD all obtained funds to increase their additional security measures.

The fraud enforcement and Recovery Act now sanctions on the Government to prosecute companies or individuals currently out of reach. Currently, an incidence of mortgage fraud can result in investigation, prosecution, civil penalties and imprisonment at the federal level, which is opposed to the previous gentler State sanctions applied previously. This new law applies to all types of mortgage fraud, no matter how minor the offence.

In the past, these schemes defrauded by home owners, real estate, lenders and builders of billions of dollars each year. The FBI intends to send a message that mortgage fraud will not be tolerated and it is expected that the criminals will receive stiff penalties in order to set an example for others.

The second draft law, simply entitled, “Helping families save their homes Act” aims to simplify the process owners receive financing of exclusion and modifications of existing loans. Also makes it easier for the lender to offer these types of options and hopefully avoid an imminent exclusion.

The new law also provides protection for tenants who live in a household whose owners face exclusion. Under the old rules, the tenants would have to happen immediately after the exclusion, they now have the option of continuing the rent for a period negotiated with the lender. This makes sense on many levels. Now hundreds of families who otherwise would have found on the street, still have houses. Lenders no longer have to deal with the problems associated with the maintenance of an empty House. Let us hope that this will reduce occurrences of neighborhoods awarded houses sitting vacant and Repair complete patient and vandalism. In many cases, reliable tenants are happy to stay and keep the property.

The law provides extra help for homeless, makes better use of local organizations in this role and allowed more latitude to allocate federal funds for assistance.

Part of the reason that fraud mortgage became in so widespread was attributed to the lack of a vigilant only affiliation to oversee the loan of the lagoons, insurance and loans schemes bids. Instead there was a series of small agencies, each view of only a part of the problem, but not single unit had the power to actually address the issue as a whole. Currently, the administration of Obama has a plan in the works to establish a federal agency designed to monitor all the participants; the small corridors to the main lenders.

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PS: look at this: Secrets of defence of exclusion: click here!

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EDITOR’S COMMENT: When regulators refer to the banks as “clients” you know you have a problem. The mess (chaos) left in the wake of invalid mortgages and notes, fraudulent foreclosures, fraudulent credit bids and resales is going to stay with us regardless of what efforts are made to paper over the stupid PONZI scheme based upon the illusion of securitization of residential mortgages. Title is still going to be a problem that won’t go away and pretending otherwise doesn’t help

Taking houses away from people that supposedly have not paid their mortgage payments may sound like normal business procedure. But giving those houses to parties who were not and are not the lenders is a gift to the banking interests that runs contrary to the interests of the nation and the fragile economic recovery.

It’s not as simple as it looks. It’s been said to me that when you boil it down, the foreclosure problem stems from people not paying their mortgage payments, with the hidden presumption behind that being the mortgage debt is valid. The fact that the lien was not and could not be perfected is too technical for most people to consider.

And the big fact that the deal was a fraud on both the lender-investor and the borrowers through deception as to the value of the property, the viability of the loan transaction and the value of the mortgage bonds is something that nobody wants to think through — because it would mean turning 80 million real estate transactions on their head.

In one way it is very simple. Nearly none of those 80 million transactions would have been completed but for the grand deception and grand illusion. The investors would not have advanced the money and the borrowers wouldn’t have taken it. No investor or borrower would have done a $300,000 loan transaction on property worth half that amount, but they did because they believed the inflated appraisals and ratings. If the proper disclosures were made, the mortgage bubble would not be part of our history and the recession might not either.

So for those people who want to “boil it down” and get it simple, here you go: the investors and homeowners were defrauded. They are the losers here, not the banks. But it is the banks that are getting the benefit of payments on loans that run from inflated to non-existent and the willingness of our system to give them the houses too — while the real parties in interest —- the investor-lenders and the homeowners — lose their money and their homes. And let’s remember that when “investors” lose money that includes pension funds that now won’t be able to come up with promised retirement benefits that were part of the deal when employees worked for those companies.

Judging by last week’s performance, it sure looks as though the country’s top bank regulator is back to its old tricks.

Though, to be honest, calling the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency a “regulator” is almost laughable. The Environmental Protection Agency is a regulator. The O.C.C. is a coddler, a protector, an outright enabler of the institutions it oversees.

Back during the subprime bubble, for instance, it was so eager to please its “clients” — yes, that’s how O.C.C. executives used to describe the banks — that it steamrolled anyone who tried to stop lending abuses. States and cities around the country would pass laws requiring consumer-friendly measures such as mandatory counseling for subprime borrowers, or the listing of the fees the banks were going to charge for the loan. The O.C.C. would then use its power to either block or roll back the legislation.

It relied on the doctrine of pre-emption, which holds, in essence, that federal rules pre-empt state laws. More than 20 times, states and municipalities passed laws aimed at making subprime loans less predatory; every time, the O.C.C. ruled that national banks were exempt. Which, of course, rendered the new laws moot.

You’d think the financial crisis would have knocked some sense into the agency, exposing the awful consequences of its regulatory negligence. But you would be wrong. Like the banks themselves, the O.C.C. seems to have forgotten that the financial crisis ever took place.

It has consistently defended the Too Big to Fail banks. It opposes lowering hidden interchange fees for debit cards, even though such a move is mandated by law, because the banks don’t want to take the financial hit. Its foot-dragging in implementing the new Dodd-Frank laws stands in sharp contrast to, say, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which is working diligently to create a regulatory framework for derivatives, despite Republican opposition. Like the banks, it views the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as the enemy.

And, as we learned last week, it is doing its darndest to make sure the banks escape the foreclosure crisis — a crisis they created with their sloppy, callous and often illegal practices — with no serious consequences. There is really no other way to explain the “settlement” it announced last week with 14 of the biggest mortgage servicers (which includes all the big banks).

The proposed terms call on servicers to have a single point of contact for homeowners with troubled mortgages. They would have to stop the odious practice of secretly beginning foreclosure proceedings while supposedly working on a mortgage modification. They would have to hire consultants to do spot-checks to see if people were foreclosed on improperly. (Gee, I wonder how that’s going to turn out?)

If you’re thinking: that’s what they should have done in the first place, you’re right. If you’re wondering what the consequences will be if the banks don’t abide by the terms, the answer is: there aren’t any. And although the O.C.C. says that it might add a financial penalty, I’ll believe it when I see it. While John Walsh, the acting comptroller, called the terms “tough,” they’re anything but.

No, the real reason the O.C.C. raced to come up with its weak settlement proposal is that last month, a document surfaced that contained a rather different set of terms with the banks. These were settlement ideas being batted around by the states’ attorneys general, who have been investigating the foreclosure crisis since late October. The document suggested that the attorneys general were not only trying to fix the foreclosure process but also wanted to penalize the banks for their illegal actions.

Their ideas included all the terms (and then some) included in the O.C.C. proposal, though with more specificity. Unlike the O.C.C., the attorneys general had devised a way to actually enforce their settlement, by deputizing the new consumer bureau, which opens in July. And they wanted to impose a stiff fine — possibly $20 billion — which would be used to modify mortgages. In other words, the attorneys general were trying to help homeowners rather than banks.

By jumping out in front of the attorneys general, the O.C.C. has made the likelihood of a 50-state master settlement much less likely. Any such settlement needs bipartisan support; now, thanks to the O.C.C., there’s a good chance that Republican attorneys general will walk away. The banks will be able to say that they’ve already settled with the federal government, so why should they have to settle a second time? If they wind up being sued by the states, the federal settlement will help them in court.

“It’s a vintage O.C.C. move,” said Prentiss Cox, a law professor at the University of Minnesota who was formerly an assistant attorney general. “It is clearly an attempt to undercut the A.G.’s”

Old habits die hard in Washington. The O.C.C.’s historical reliance on pre-emption should have died after the financial crisis. Instead, it’s merely been disguised to look like a settlement.

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JPM Makes $2 BILLION While Investors Lose $500 MILLION

“The investment bank through a myriad of bankruptcy-remote controlled vehicles steps in and says WE ARE THE AGENT FOR THE LENDER AND WE WANT TO FORECLOSE. And then in the suit with investors says WE ARE NOT YOUR AGENT OR FIDUCIARY AND THIS MONEY WE COLLECTED IS OURS. In plain language the investment banks are claiming the full value of the original investment, the profit they made from the “failure of the investment,” and the house from the borrower. Somehow this has been translated into a free house for the borrower if the borrower successfully challenges this scenario. Considering that the investment bank and its remote vehicles never loaned a dime of their own money and never bought the receivable from the homeowner, it is an inescapable conclusion that under current conditions IT IS THE BANK THAT IS GETTING A FREE HOUSE.” — NEIL GARFIELD

EDITORIAL NOTE: The idea that the banks could take $500 million from investors, turn the investment into a loss, and than make $2 Billion for themselves leaving the investors empty handed has been openly dismissed as ridiculous conspiracy theorizing. Nonetheless, I have consistently maintained on these pages that this is exactly what was done, that there were no losses to WALL STREET on mortgages, and that the bailout increased their profits instead of decreasing their alleged losses. It seems, as Renaldo Reyes of Deutsch Bank put it, “counter-intuitive.” If you put $500 into an investment how can anyone make any more than the $500 you invested. Enter the magic of Wall Street.

The unfairness of this turn of events is obvious and the subject of the lawsuit against JPM described below in the article from the NY Times. And the fact that JPM had direct knowledge of every part of this all the way up to Jamie Dimon doesn’t come as any surprise either. What is important here is that Wall Street found a way to create lousy investments in which investors would lose all their money and to multiply that loss into a grand windfall for the Wall Street firm that created or sold the investment in the first place.

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see where the incentive is. If you were the broker and you sold $500 million worth of securities to an investor you would get a fee. Fair enough. And you wouldn’t see another fee until the investor sold it, hopefully using your services. Fair enough. That is how Wall Street is supposed to work — putting buyers and sellers of various types of securities together and taking a fee for their services. This is the purpose of Wall Street which enables the marketplace to have liquidity — i.e., people can get money when they need it and can get a return on their investment when they have extra money.

Wall Street shifted the paradigm starting around 10 years ago when they essentially decided that neither their clients nor the people who were affected by investments made through Wall Street should get to keep any of the money or wealth they had at stake. They wanted it all and they set out to get it, quite successfully as it turned out. The current paradigm is to get investors to put their money into failures, create vehicles that essentially bet on the failure, put provisions in the documents that guarantees that you can call it a failure even if it isn’t, and then collect all the money back that SHOULD go to the investors, because that’s what it says in the fine print of what the investors bought.

Once you have a sure thing — a failure even if nothing failed — you can now place a bet, comfortably knowing that it will pay off because control over the “failure” is completely in your hands. I am of course referring to Credit Default Swaps and other more ornate synthetic collateralized debt obligation derivative instruments.

Back to the broker. If you were that broker, would you (a) wait until the investor decided to sell the investment and take a fee of 1% or (b) pull the plug on the client’s investment and earn 400% of the client’s money without any of your own money at risk? You might think that JPM would have at least offered the money back on the investment, but no, like I said, they want it all. You might say that the investment bank’s receipt of $2 Billion on the client’s $500 million investment was as a fiduciary for the client and not for themselves and you’d be wrong under the current rules. You might say this stupid — because it is. But I can’t see a scenario in which pension fund managers are going to keep buying failed investments, even if they are bribed. This is like any other PONZI scheme or house cards. They all come to an end and people get hurt.

Now move over to the homeowner who “borrower” money from a fund that came from many investors like the pension fund above. He borrowed $100,000 and owes it to somebody, but who? The investor has written off the investment and expects to get their money back from the investment bank because the loan was not what they were told they would be getting. The investor wants no part of the homeowner’s house of obligation and doesn’t care if the homeowner has any obligation.

The investment bank through a myriad of bankruptcy-remote controlled vehicles steps in and says WE ARE THE AGENT FOR THE LENDER AND WE WANT TO FORECLOSE. And then in the suit with investors says WE ARE NOT YOUR AGENT OR FIDUCIARY AND THIS MONEY WE COLLECTED IS OURS. In plain language the investment banks are claiming the full value of the original investment, the profit they made from the “failure of the investment,” and the house from the borrower. Somehow this has been translated into a free house for the borrower if the borrower successfully challenges this scenario. Considering that the investment bank and its remote vehicles never loaned a dime of their own money and never bought the receivable from the homeowner, it is an inescapable conclusion that under current conditions IT IS THE BANK THAT IS GETTING A FREE HOUSE.

In the summer of 2007, as the first tremors of the coming financial crisis were being felt on Wall Street, top executives of JPMorgan Chase were raising red flags about a troubled investment vehicle called Sigma, which was based in London. But the bank chose not to move out $500 million in client assets that it had put into Sigma two months earlier.

Sigma collapsed a year later. Now, new documents unsealed late last month as part of a lawsuit by bank clients against JPMorgan show for the first time just how high the warnings about Sigma went — all the way to the office of the bank’s chief executive, Jamie Dimon.

While the clients lost nearly all their money, JPMorgan collected nearly $1.9 billion from Sigma’s demise, according to the suit. That’s because as Sigma’s troubles worsened, JPMorgan lent the vehicle billions of dollars and received valuable assets in the form of a security deposit.

After Sigma came undone in September 2008, many of those assets ultimately became JPMorgan’s and eventually appreciated in value, giving the bank a large profit, the suit says.

The case, which is filed as a class action and includes several pension funds as named plaintiffs, accuses JPMorgan of breaching its responsibility to keep its clients in safe investments, and it sheds new light on one of Wall Street’s oldest problems — whether banks treat their clients’ money with the same care that they treat their own.

Joseph Evangelisti, a spokesman for JPMorgan, called some of the suit’s accusations “ludicrous” and said the bank lent more than $8 billion to Sigma to try to help the vehicle survive, not to profit from its failure. He said the bank did its best to protect its clients’ money and that its dealings with Sigma were to the clients’ benefit.

The suit, however, asserts that JPMorgan workers developed a “grand scheme” to profit from Sigma in the event of a collapse, even though employees at another part of the bank left client money invested in the vehicle.

One internal e-mail between top executives, for instance, states that the firm needed to protect its own interests in its dealings with Sigma, without taking into account the clients’ position. The suit also contends that the bank’s loans to Sigma gave it access to the vehicle’s best assets, at a discount, which proved to be a profitable trade for the bank.

JPMorgan has said in a court filing that no such scheme existed and that it acted properly in the way it managed client money.

The bank argues that by law, different units of the company that dealt with Sigma could not share information, because of so-called Chinese walls, which are meant to prevent the spread of nonpublic information within the firm. According to this argument, the unit that invested client money in Sigma could not confer with the arm that lent the vehicle money.

But because the information rose to executives who oversee the entire company and were in a position to intervene, analysts say the issue is trickier.

“In one sense, I don’t think it’s good enough to say, ‘We’re a large organization, we can’t relay information.’ That, in many respects, is a cop-out,” said William Fitzpatrick, a banking analyst at Manulife Asset Management, a Canadian insurance company that is not party to the case. “Does Jamie Dimon have some sort of veto power where he can overrule it? That gets very gray.”

But he added, “I can see where the banks would come back and say, ‘The Chinese walls are there for a reason. We don’t want to put in manual overrides.’ ”

In many cases, the rules and practices banks follow are based on nonpublic information they receive.

It’s not as clear what a bank’s obligations are with insights that are based on public information, like some of the information related to Sigma.

Within the financial services industry, the case is being closely watched. A victory by JPMorgan’s clients may mean that banks will have to be more careful about deciding whether to share — or silo — information that affects their clients’ investments. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, a prominent trade group, wrote a brief in support of JPMorgan last month saying that the pension funds that are suing had an “unprecedented and novel theory” that “contradicts decades of Congressional and regulatory guidance.” The trade group said that if the plaintiffs won, it would impose greater costs on banks.

Whatever the legal outcome, the new documents paint a picture of how one of Wall Street’s strongest players profited in its deals with the weak.

The events described in the suit, which was filed in Federal District Court for the Southern District in New York, began in the summer of 2007. That June, JPMorgan’s unit put about $500 million from pension funds and other clients into notes issued by Sigma, meaning those clients would be repaid based on how Sigma’s financial bets performed.

The investments were made by the bank’s securities lending unit, which stood to share in profits if the bet was successful but would not share in losses if it wasn’t.

According to the new documents, by that August, JPMorgan executives elsewhere in the bank began to worry about Sigma and other similar entities called structured investment vehicles, or SIVs.

Mr. Dimon is named in several documents related to these vehicles.

One e-mail in August 2007 said Mr. Dimon was interested in hearing about “the systemic risk of a complete unwind of all SIVs,” according to the suit. Another e-mail told a bank worker to prepare “a very real picture of the assets that will be unwound with particular focus on Sigma.” At the end of August, Mr. Dimon received a memo on the SIV market, with a note about Sigma in the cover sheet, according to the lawsuit.

That same month, a fixed-income executive, John Kodweis, wrote in an e-mail that he believed it was probable the entire sector would run into trouble.

If that were to happen, the SIVs might have to unload $400 billion in valuable assets at fire-sale prices, he wrote. He suggested the bank create a team, which the suit says it did, to take advantage of the forced selling.

In the same e-mail, Mr. Kodweis noted that the block of SIV investments that JPMorgan had made on behalf of its clients was among the top 12 investors in all SIVs.

Other top officials at the bank were also aware of the conflict. In September that year, as the bank’s top brass considered lending money to Sigma, the bank’s chief credit officer, Andrew Cox, wrote that “I have heard JPM Asset Mgmt are large buyers of SIV and Sigma CP,” referring to short-term debt called commercial paper. “Do we need to consider the firmwide position?”

The bank’s chief risk officer, John Hogan, wrote back that JPMorgan needed to protect its own position and not worry about what its clients were invested in.

By February 2008, credit continued to tighten, and Sigma was desperate for cash to finance its operations. An executive in JPMorgan’s London office, Mark Crawley, wrote that it was “unlikely” that Sigma would survive. He also said there could be risks to the bank’s reputation if it went ahead with the loan. Still, JPMorgan proceeded.

As time passed in 2008, bank executives did more trades with Sigma.

Mr. Crawley e-mailed Mr. Cox to say that the bank was treating its loans to Sigma as a “trade,” rather than as support for Sigma and that there were “very big moneymaking opportunities as the market deteriorates” because Sigma had what he called high-quality assets.

Mr. Cox described Sigma’s health as “a race against time” in a note to Bill Winters, then co-head of the investment bank, and Mr. Crawley.

By September 2008, when Sigma defaulted, JPMorgan had lent it a total of $8.4 billion and had received $9.3 billion of assets as a security deposit, according to the suit. The value of the collateral was dubious at that point, given the panic of the financial crisis, and it was unknown if the assets would decrease in value.

But a year later, many investments had risen in value, the suit says. JPMorgan made over $470 million in profit within a year of the default by selling off some of the collateral and had recorded a paper gain of $1.2 billion on assets it still held, according to the suit. The bank had also made $228 million in fees from Sigma in exchange for the loans. The total gain was nearly $1.9 billion, the suit says.

The pension funds whose money JPMorgan had put into Sigma lost nearly all of their investment. The suit said their $500 million became worth 6 cents on the dollar.

Mr. Evangelisti, the JPMorgan spokesman, said the bank disputed the profit figures but he would not say how much the bank believed it made on the Sigma transactions.

He also said the unit that put the client money in Sigma “closely monitored” the investment and did its best to decide whether to sell it early. He said a different client investment in Sigma was repaid in full to JPMorgan clients just weeks before Sigma collapsed.

The bank also said in a court filing that it would have been irrational for its executives and traders to try to obtain Sigma’s assets by lending money to the vehicle. The bank could have instead just purchased some of those assets, though they might have come at a higher price.

In addition, Mr. Evangelisti said it was Sigma that approached JPMorgan about the loans, and Sigma executives told the bank the loans would help the JPMorgan clients who were Sigma investors.

He added that in the fall of 2008, when it came time for the bank to auction off some of the assets JPMorgan had received from the failed vehicles, “in many cases there were no takers.”

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Delay The Foreclosure Process or Not to Delay?

Foreclosure Defense is tricky business, as a fraud examiner I have heard may varied versions of the same tactics. Inclusive of the Foreclosure delay tactics. This is a process that I am familiar with and cannot completely agree with it’s intent and purpose. Allow me to expound further, many consumers that are facing foreclosure tend to appreciate the idea of delaying the process in the hopes of finding the money or some other way of curing the default allegations of the creditor who is dead set on foreclosing on the consumers property. It is of my opinion that if you truly seek to simply delay you may be opening up a larger can of worms that you may not have expected.

Realize that every day that a consumer is in foreclosure there are fees that accrue and interest. This interest is known as Per Diem interest. Many times in reviewing documents I look for any clause in the mortgage or origination documents that would allow for the calculation and implementation of any such interest on a defaulted note or mortgage. If not there may be an argument to bring before the court regarding the accounting used to claim the amounts claimed as due. Many times the Per Diem interest in a foreclosure can escalate the totals by leaps and bounds! This is a matter that should be discussed with your attorney and then after you have done that talk to as many other attorneys as possible without leading on as to what you have already learned. This way you can learn more about the possibility of this argument in your state and you do not give the attorney a reason to avoid the possible claim should there be one and it received negative review from an attorney that may not know too much about this particular animal.

You must always keep in mind that not every attorney knows what he is talking about. In today’s plethora of foreclosure cases across America I have found myself in hundreds of conversations over the last few years that lead me to the conclusion that too many attorneys are only now trying to catch up on the foreclosure defense arguments. For this same reason many attorneys simply look for the easy route and stall foreclosure without actually defending against it. Your biggest challenge while in foreclosure is to find a competent attorney that will actually defend your consumer rights and seek liabilities against your creditors versus being complacent and keeping the age old mindset of ” You owe the money, you should pay”. The issue for many is simple.

I know I owe the money, but do I truly owe it to the foreclosing lender or creditor?Can the lender or creditor lawfully validate and verify the alleged debt?Has the lender or creditor taken a tax write-off or claimed an insurance policy to payoff the amounts claimed as owed?Has the Foreclosing lender or creditor (Plaintiff) sold off it’s true interests in the note and mortgage to an unknown party leaving the lender without rights to foreclose on you?Has the lender sold off the mortgage without the promissory note?Are the assignments made to a subsequent lender or creditor valid or made solely for the purpose to foreclose?Are the named authorized parties real persons and if they are are they truly authorized to create such documents that support claims of debt against you?Does the chain of title reflect the true owner in due course status of the court record?Did the foreclosing lender or creditor actually have the right to foreclose when the foreclosure was filed?Is the accounting for the loan or credit account accurate? Is it possible that you paid more than you were supposed too and actually be up to date on the account? This happens with adjustable rate mortgages more over than fixed.OK, it was not fair to say “Simple”. For an examiner there are basic questions that are formulated in a qualified written request or Fair Debt Collection Practices act request. Of course they are better stated but for example purposes they are here in this simple form.

The point being that if you ask the right questions in the proper manner and form utilizing Federal consumer rights mandates such as 15 § 1692g Fair Debt Collection Practices act or section 6 – 2605 of the Real Estate Settlement procedures act you may place the lender or creditor between the same rock and a hard place that you were in! You see in today’s foreclosure arena there is a world wind of falsified affidavits as can be proven by the Chicago example of Shapiro and Fisher a Foreclosure Mill Attorney firm who in March 2, 2011caused to be issued a General Administrative order No. 2011-1 which stayed 1,700 foreclosure cases. Of course there should have been sanction for altering affidavits and basically perpetrating fraud on the court we find that a slap on the hand was suffice. The defendants should ban together and hold every player accountable and seek damages for this scheme and artifice to defraud if the court isn’t willing to do it. Then there is what has not been addressed yet the practice of Foreclosure mill attorneys who create assignments for the Plaintiff. The list can go on and on.

It never ceases to amaze me how often questionable or out right fraudulent documents pass the muster in a cour of law. The main reason this happens is because everyone trusts the attorneys and the court to do the right thing as it should be. he truth of the matter is be skeptical of every document, date, signature and claim. Everything should be verified and authenticated. this is where you dig deep and find where they intend to create illusory authority. I even go to the Illinois State website to verify each and every notary commission. You would be shocked to find how often the notary seal and signature is a fraudulent acknowledgment!

1. Verify every signature! is it legible? No? Then it may be a forgery. A google search for the name may reveal that the person is signing documents across the country for different lenders as an authorized party.

2. Do the math! Calculate every page that has numbers, compare and see if they all match. If not then there may be a problem with the amounts claimed as owed or a problem with the Truth in lending which can lead to relief of claims or even the right to cancel the loan through a process known as rescission.

3. Verify the signatures that are alleged to be yours. They could be cut and paste or a robot may have duplicated your signature which is often difficult to know unless you have the original, to get the original arrangements need be made with the lender and the court.

4. What they don’t have the note or mortgage original? Then what rights or authority do they have to foreclose? This is a very iffy matter that requires professional help and an understanding of contract law, the uniform commercial code and other laws that will be discussed in further detail as the blog develops.

You may also visit or or any of the foreclosure confidential web pages that will have varied information regarding different articles, news stories and foreclosure. loan modification or short sale help or foreclosure self help products.

One thing that I always look to do is first find evidence that may disprove any obligation by the consumer to pay! Hey that is what all the fuss is about! Then I look for any evidence that would prove that the foreclosing attorney may have used some artifice or scheme to force jurisdiction over the subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Even if the lender or creditor does have the right to foreclose a jurisdictional issue will remove the ability for the court to hear the case or better yet for those who have already been foreclosed on, can actually reverse the whole foreclosure process! Yes, get the house back! The lender will definitely re-file but this will allow you to do your homework and find claims against the lender that may cause a workout or Quiet Title.

Interestingly enough I have witnessed first hand situations in which the lenders or creditors receive requests to verify and validate the debt they immediately, and without any hardship letters or any financial information qualify and offer a approved Loan modification. This is a sign of an inability of the lender to validate the debt under the provisions of Federal Law. An opportunity for a better settlement or quiet title.

As this blog further develops I will give detailed information that will allow the average person to locate claims and defenses that can fight a foreclosure versus simply buying time or delaying the foreclosure process. It’s about results not delays. You must also be aware that many courts (at least in my opinion) are creditor friendly and consumer deadly. There are cases in which the consumer is better of recusing the judge ( switching Judges) as there are some who will not give you a fair shake. Regardless of what the evidence reveals. There are Judges that have made special orders to even speed up the foreclosure process

More to come…

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